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1. Introduction 
The mortgage crisis has demonstrated the weakness of regulatory authorities and countries’  
institutional systems in responding to and resolving banking sector problems. Many decisions 
regarding interventionin the banking sector were made too late,and many such decisions were 
rushed, without proper evaluation of the effectiveness of the chosen mechanisms and their potential 
consequences for the banking sector (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010;McCarthy et al., 2010). Indeed, four 
years after the start of the mortgage crisis, several countries continue to struggle with banking sector 
problems. In addition, many institutions continue to hold substantial amounts of toxic debt, making 
their recovery, and thuseconomic growth, more difficult.The poor record of most countries in 
resolvingthe mortgage banking crisis motivated regulators to adopt various recommendationsin 
shaping future regulatory responses to systemic banking crises(see, for   example:   “Issues   and  
Assumption   for   the  Design  of   an  Upgraded  Bank  Resolution  Framework”,   The  World  Bank  Report,  
2012;   ”Technical  Details  of   a  Possible  EU  Framework   for  Bank  Recovery  and  Resolution”,  Brussels,  
2012;  “A  Special  Resolution  Regime  on  UK  Banking  Act”,  Bank  of  England,  2009;  “Resolution  Policies  
Acts  on  Restoring   the  Distressed   Institutions”   in   Ireland,  Germany,   and  Denmark; Dodd-Frank Act, 
2010). Despite some minor differences between national documents, most countries implemented 
similar approaches. The recommended policy instruments include blanket guarantees and liquidity 
provisions for the initial stage of the crisis;and capital injections, asset repurchases, and debt 
restructuring programs for the resolution of banks’ balance sheet problems. 
Despiteregulators’   recent initiatives, the existing literature has presented no clear evidence of the 
effectivenessof recommended government intervention instruments in restoring banking sector 
stability. This question is further raised by recent empirical evidence in di Patti and Kashyap 
(2010)that only one-third of banks that received government assistance have recovered. Based on 
the theoretical literature there are at least three hypotheses. First, the decisions to intervene might 
bepolitical in nature and not driven by banks’   fundamentals. As a result, interventionsmight be 
directed toward politically connectedinstitutions rather than those most in need(Braun and Raddatz, 
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2010; Tahoun and van Lent, 2010;Duchin and Sosyura, 2011). Second, the bailout programsdo 
notaddress theproblems of specific distressed banks. This might be due to an inadequate strategy 
relative to a bank’s  problems  or the insufficient scale of an intervention, hamperinga bank’s recovery 
(Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010; Giannetti and Simonov, 2013). Finally, di Patti and Kashyap’s (2010) 
results may beattributablesolely to the ineffectiveness of policy measures. Delays inimplementation, 
the passiveness of regulators in implementingrestructuringmeasures, and the policy of restraint 
often exercised by politicians may undermine the effectiveness of policy instruments(Kane, 1989; 
Boot and Thakor, 1993; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Morrison and White, 2013). 
On this basis, we argue that government interventions can only be effective in resolving banking 
sector distress when appropriate and timely support goes to the institutions most in need of 
assistance. The present study raises these issues and attempts to determine the effectiveness of 
government interventions in restoring banking sector stability by posing five research questions. 
First, do the right banks receive government support? Second, does government support address the 
problems of the banks receiving assistance? Third, does the government deliver support in a timely 
manner? Fourth, given the banks’  problems,  do  government  interventions  effectively  restore  banking  
sector stability; and finally, if so, which intervention mechanisms are most important to banking 
sector recovery? 
To conduct this research, we employ a novel bank-level database coveringthe entire set of 
intervention mechanisms for all banks in 23 countries during their systemic banking crises.In total, 
we identified 114 banks bailed out during financial crises over the period of 1991-2002. This dataset 
allows explicit control for the type of policy measure employed and the scale of an intervention in a 
bank. Additionally, we also control for the timing of government support. The difference-in-
differences(DID) approach employed in our analysis offers several advantages. First, itenables us to 
compare the performance of banks within the same country that received assistance to those of 
banks that did not receive assistance during the year of the intervention and thereafter. We have 
identified 118 non-supported banks with similar specializations and size to those covered by the 
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bailout programs. We analyze the performance of banks over a five-year period, which captures the 
average duration of the business cycle (NBER, 2010). Moreover, our DIDapproach allows us to 
partially control for the supported  banks’ level of distress and the timing of the policy intervention. If 
supported banks are highly distressedrelative to other banks, this could indicate that support from 
the government arrived too late, andthat such institutions require policy measures different from 
thoseundertaken (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Freixas and Parigi, 2008). 
Second, our methodology allows us to examine the supported banks’  performance in the post-crisis 
period relative to their initial performance levels, enabling an assessment of the effectiveness of 
policyinterventions. Should assisted   banks’ performance improve relative to the initial period, 
thiscould indicate that the intervention mechanisms were successful. Ifthe assisted  banks’  conditions 
deteriorate relative to the intervention period,and relative to other banks, this might indicatefailure 
in the intervention mechanisms. Finally, under this approach, we can control for endogeneity. 
Weaker initial positionsin the pre-crisis period may result in a worse post-intervention condition 
compared to other banks. In such cases,recovery requirestime,and does not necessarilyimply that 
the intervention mechanismswere ineffective. Our DID approach allows us to control for this problem 
by assessing supported  banks’  performance relative to their initial performance, as well as relative to 
other banks. Additionally, we include country economic variables, enabling us to control for a 
country’s  economic  environment  and  its  effects on both groups of banks. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant crisis 
containment and resolution policies recommended in government documents; Section 3 describes 
the data and methodology; Section 4 presents the empirical results with respect to the determinants 
of bailouts; Section 5 discusses the effectiveness of specific policy   measures   in   restoring   banks’  
health; and Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. Mechanisms available to governmentsto support the banking sector 
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Beginning in July 2007, the subprime mortgage meltdown in the United States resulted in a systemic 
banking crisis in many industrial countries promptingthe implementationof various strategies to 
rescue the distressed banking sector. In the aftermath, many governments and international 
institutions, including the World Bank and IMF, started work on Banking Sector Resolution Plans to 
establish future government actions to be taken during such crises. These actions are intendedto 
avert, in a timely and effective manner, contagion effects of crises and restore confidence in the 
financial sector. In later stages, these should promote banking sector restructuring and enable it to 
regain stability. Apart fromminor differences between country-leveldocuments, the recommended 
strategies are similar and rely on the experiences of countries in previous systemic banking crises. 
These include blanket guarantees and liquidity provisions for the containment stage of the crisis; and 
capital injections, asset purchases, and debt restructuring programs   for   the   resolution   of   banks’  
balance sheet problems. 
In the initial stage of the crisis, uncertainty and a loss of confidence in the financial system may lead 
toruns on deposits at distressed banks. Thisdepositors’   behavior quickly dries up the liquidity of 
affected banking institutions, and more importantly,increases the risk of contagion to other healthy 
banks,a situation that maycause the interbank market to freeze. Without atimely and effective 
intervention from central banks, bank assets deteriorate further, leading to potential bankruptcy at 
these institutions in the final stage. It is at this stage of the crisis, that central banks tend to step in by 
offering blanket guarantees andinjecting liquidity into banks. These instruments are intended to 
restore confidence and provide the banking sector with needed liquidity. 
The second stage of the crisis requires complex mechanisms to restructure thebanks’  balance sheets. 
Most recently, various countries have implemented Resolution Acts to address banking sector 
problems. Thesestrategies include government-assisted mergers and acquisitions (M&As), debt 
write-downs, asset separation involving transfers of non-performing assets to newly created 
institutions, andas a last resort, nationalization of distressed institutions. Government-assisted 
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M&Asinvolvegovernment help to find an acquirer for a troubled bank. In practice, the government 
participates in restructuring a bank’s debt by taking it over to improve the chance of success of this 
type of intervention. In addition, the government may guarantee the future losses of an acquired 
institution, as in case of the transactions between Bear Sterns and JP Morgan, or Merrill Lynch and 
Bank of America. Sheng (1996) claims that government-assisted M&As are especially popular when 
the government has limited funds to handle the closure of insolvent institutions,while the financial 
industry as a whole has sufficient resources to absorb the failing bank. Therefore, this type of 
intervention is often used in the initial phase of a crisis. In addition, this bailout strategy is 
psychologically advantageous, as no institution is treated as a loser. Importantly,as government-
assisted M&A transactionsdo not assume shareholder approval, and since the distressed institution 
operates on a stand-alone basis, this may strengthen market monitoring mechanisms. 
When M&A transactions are not possible given the market conditions, many country-level 
documents suggest the creationof a “bridge bank.”  The  concept  of  a bridge bank involves splitting a 
distressed institution into a “bad” part,  which  includesthe  affected  bank’s  toxic  assets  and  is  subject  
to restructuring; and a “good”  part,  including  the  bank’s  non-toxic assets, is transferred to the bridge 
bank,  together  with  the  bank’s  liabilities. The bridge bank then operates under a new banking license 
under the supervision of the national financial or resolution authority, with the goal ofincreasing its 
value possibly resulting in a sale. This strategy enables governments to handle especially large, “too  
big   to   fail”institutions when market transactions are not possible while limiting the costs of 
resolution. Theadvantage of this strategy is that it does not require the government to capitalize the 
newly created institution. 
Nationalization involves the capitalizationof distressed institutionswith national funds in exchange 
for ownership in the institution to prevent the bank’sbankruptcy, and thus limiting the negative 
consequences of its distress for the banking sector. This is especially common with 
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systemicallyimportant banks. However, it is also one of the most costly formsof intervention in the 
banking sector.  
The current Resolution Acts stress the importance of well-conducted restructuring for the recovery 
of banking sectors,recommendingtwo possible methods to restructure thebad debt of distressed 
banks:writing it off at a cost to taxpayers, and creatinga restructuring fund such as a “Bad  Bank”  or  
an “Asset  Management   Company   (AMC).”Under the first strategy,the government takes over the 
institution’s  bad  debtto the amount of the   fall   in  value  of   the  bank’s  assets, recapitalizingthe bank 
and enabling it to remain in the market. The assumption behind this mechanism is that the 
government does not participate in any bank operations,allowing the disciplinary mechanisms of the 
market to work(Dell’Ariccia   and  Ratnovski,   2012). By contrast, through the AMC mechanism, non-
performing loans are transferred from a distressed institution’s balance sheet to a newlycreated 
fund. The fund cleans up the bank’s balance sheet and restoresthe  bank’s  profitability, then tries to 
maximize the recovery of bad debt by actively restructuring it. Importantly, it is assumed that the 
AMC is in the hands of the private sector and that the state does not disposeof managed assets. 
2.1. How effective are government interventions and their measures – Literature Review  
 
The academic literature presents mixed evidence regarding the effects of various bailout strategies 
on   banks’   performance. Theory suggests that government interventions should positively affect 
banks’  performance  due  to  reductions  in  refinancing  costs,  the restructuring of distressed debt, and 
improved capital ratios due to capital injections. Empirically, Hakenes and Schnabel (2010) support 
this   argument,   documenting   that   government   interventions   increase   banks’   profitability   due   to  
access to more favorable funding. Similarly, Cordella and Yeyati (2003) argue that liquidity provisions 
positively  affect  banks’   capital  and   improve  banks’   charter  values.  However,  Berger and Bouwman 
(2009),Duchin and Sosyura (2011), and Mehran and Thakor (2011) find that capital injections 
improve  banks’  capital  positions.  Recently,  such  findings  have  received  support  in  research  into  the  
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mortgage crisis of 2007-2010. Rose and Wieladek (2012), using bank-level data from the UK, examine 
the effects of pubic capital injections and nationalization. The authors find that such measures were 
successful in restoring market confidence during the mortgage crisis in the UK, and consequently 
improved  banks’  financial  performance.  Harris et al. (2013) examine the impact of the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) capital injections on the operational efficiency of commercial banks. They find 
that such restructuring methods decreased the operational efficiency of funded banks but improved 
asset quality. Ding et al. (2012) document that government interventions in Asian economies have 
improved all six financial indicators in terms of solvency, credit risk and profitability, compared with 
the pre-crisis period. In addition, regulatory actions may restrict the banking business and thus 
discipline bank management (Dam and Koetter, 2012). Government interventions are also likely to 
strengthen   banks’   monitoring   incentives,   which   should   hasten   banks’   recovery   (Dell’Ariccia   and  
Ratnovski, 2012; Mehran and Thakor, 2011). Recently, the empirical literature has found that 
government interventions are not as effective as initially assumed in the theoretical literature. Di 
Patti and Kashyap (2010) argue that only one-third of banks recover, given regulatory support. 
Tahoun and van Lent (2010) and Duchin and Sosyura (2012) show that government interventions 
might be motivated by political interests. The authors show that, as a result, politically connected 
institutions are more likely to receive government support than other private institutions. The 
evidence whether these banks indeed need a help is ambiguous in the existing literature. Faccio et al. 
(2006) and recently Iannotta (2007) document that though politically connected institutions are 
more likely to receive government support, they also exhibit weaker performance at the time of 
intervention than private institutions. On the other hand, Gropp et al. (2011) document that bailouts 
offer banks the access to cheaper capital and thus banks may want to profit from governmental 
actions. Thus, we might expect that not necessarily weaker banks will apply for the government 
money; however we might expect that those with politically connections will be more likely to 
receive it (Faccio et al., 2006). Indeed, the report IMFGFR (2007, Chapter 3, p.7) shows that more 
capitalized investment banks, and in some countries also commercial banks with a better financial 
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performance were subject to government interventions during the mortgage crisis. This may point 
toward some political aspects involved in the governmental actions for these institutions.  
In addition, government support might be ineffective because it comes too late. Such inconsistency 
in timing suggests a lag between the stage when a bank requires support and the period when such 
assistance   is   granted,   a   period   when   a   bank’s   liquidity   crisis   may   become   transformed   into   an  
insolvency crisis. This effect might also be due to a lag in the accounting system. A bank may not 
recognize its problems at the time when support is offered, while its situation may later deteriorate 
dramatically (James, 1991; Bennet and Unal, 2009; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). In addition, some 
studies argue that the effectiveness of government interventions depends on the size and design of 
the government program. Giannetti and Simonov (2013)document that when the amount of 
government  support   is  not  sufficient  to  resolve  a  bank’s  problems  and  to  build  a  significant  capital  
buffer for the future, such a bank has an incentive to increase its risky activities. Similarly, Brei et al. 
(2013), examining rescue packages in Western economies during the 1995-2010 period, document 
that recapitalization helps banks recover only once the injected capital exceeds a critical threshold 
and   a   bank’s   balance   sheet   is   sufficiently   strengthened. With respect to the effectiveness of 
intervention programs, Schnabel (2004) documents that only liquidity provisions combined with 
blanket guarantees can restore confidence in the banking sector and thus the liquidity of banks. 
However, House and Masatlioglu (2010) argue that liquidity injection programs will not be effective if 
a bank has substantial debt overhang, with the bank remaining undercapitalized, although its 
liquidity  position  is  improved.  Nonetheless,  cleansing  a  bank’s  balance  sheet of toxic assets improves 
a   bank’s   charter   value   and   thus   gains   the   bank   more   favorable   access   to   capital.   However,  
Bhattacharya and Nyborg (2010) argue that if a bank experiences a debt overhang, equity injections 
and   asset   purchase   programs   should   be   used   to   improve   the   bank’s   capital   position.   Finally,   the  
experiences of many countries, especially Japan, Sweden and the U.S., show that the effectiveness of 
bailout  mechanisms  depends   on   a   country’s   institutional   structure.   Jonung (2009) argues that the 
reason why several bailout measures did not work during the worldwide mortgage crisis of 2007-
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2010, although such measures worked well during the Swedish crisis, relates to differences in 
countries’   institutional  environments.   Strong   transparency   and  disclosure  mechanisms,   supervisory  
authority able to impose needed restructuring in the banking sector, and a limited governmental role 
in the debt restructuring process, accompanied by large-scale protection of banks by the 
government, guaranteed the resolution of the distressed Swedish banking sector. The lack of such 
mechanisms, by contrast, postponed banking sector recovery in other countries during the mortgage 
crisis (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010).   
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1.  Methodology 
We   analyze   the   effectiveness   of   specific   government   measures   in   resolving   banks’   problems.   In  
addition, we examine how the effectiveness of specific bailout strategies depends on a   country’s  
institutional infrastructure. Effectiveness refers to the potential for a bank to gain financial strength 
and thus lowering the probability of bankruptcy in the years following intervention. To this end, we 
employ a difference-in-differences approach, allowing a comparison ofbank performance between 
those supported by government intervention with those that did not receive such support. The 
sample of non-supported banks is restricted to domestic institutions with the same specialization 
and similar asset size as the institutions that received support. This approach will allow us to avoid 
the identification problem. 
The analysis is performed on the unbalanced panel of banks over the five-year period after a specific 
government intervention in a bank, allowinga comparisonof bank performance at the time of 
intervention, and over the following five years. A five-year period to capturesthe average length of a 
business cycle (NBER, 2010). Moreover, we also argue that effective intervention mechanisms 
require some time. 
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There are therefore two sources of variation: the time during and following a government 
intervention, and the cross-section of banks that received support versus those that did not. We 
estimate the following regression:  
Yi,c,t= Ac+α1 *Xi, c,t +  α2 *Zc,t+  α3 *(Intervened  *After  the  crisis)  +  α4 (Non-Intervened  *After  the  crisis)  +  εi.c.t (1)
         
Acrepresents country-fixed effects, andYi,c,trepresents a distress measure at   time   “t” of   a   bank   “i”  
from  country  “c.”  We  measure  bank’s  distress  using the following indicators: z-score (in logarithms), 
the liquidity ratio (liquid assets to total deposits and short-term funding), the equity ratio (equity to 
total assets). Xi,c,tis a variable that includes bank characteristics including size (assets in logarithms), 
activity defined as the ratio of loans to total assets, and efficiency measured by the ratio of overhead 
to total revenues. In addition,Zi,j,tincludes country control variables (GDP growth and inflation in 
logarithms).  In  particular,  a  country’s  GDP  growth  rate  allows  us  to  control  for  a  country’s  degree  of  
distress, which affects both supported and non-supported  banks.  Below,  we  control  for  a  country’s  
institutional environment by including the following variables:  a  country’s  deposit  insurance  system,  
a  country’s  capital  requirements,  and  the  power  of  a  country’s  supervisory  authorities.  Intervened is 
a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a bank hasreceived government support, and Non-
intervened is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a bank has notreceived government 
support. After the crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for all years after the 
government intervention and zero for the year in which a government intervenes. Finally,εi,b,tis an 
error term. The key variables of interest are the interaction terms Intervened*After the crisis and 
Non-Intervened*After the crisis. We are interested in the differencebetween these two variables to 
determine whether the resolution strategies employed allowed supported institutions to recover 
their initial positions. Our inference is thus based on a comparison of the coefficients α3and α4.  
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Since banks in countries more affected by financial shock will exhibit poorer performance than 
institutions in other countries, to eliminate the effect of the magnitude of financial shock, we cluster 
the regression standard errors at the country level.  
3.2. Data 
3.2.1. Dependent variables  
To capture the impact of bailout strategies on a bank’s  performance, we use three variables: z-score 
measure, capital ratio, and the liquidity ratio. These three ratios have been used widelyin the existing 
literature (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Gropp et al., 2011). We focus on these performance measures as 
they also determine the probability of a bank’s  bankruptcy.  The aim of government interventions is 
to restore a bank’s  financial  condition and prevent bankruptcies. Analyzing the change in the level of 
these measures will provide answers to the question of how effective the intervention measures 
were to alleviate the bank’s  distress, and thus limit the probability of the bank’s  future  collapse.   
The variable of primary interest is the z-score(Zscore).This variable  measures  a  bank’s  distance  from  
insolvency and has been used widely in recent literature (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009). Specifically, 
it  shows  the  distance  of  banks’  capital  from  bankruptcy  and  is  equal  to the return on assets plus the 
capital-asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset returns. It is defined as a z-score = 
(ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA),  where  ROA  is  the  rate  of  return  on  assets,  CAR  is  the  ratio  of  equity  to  assets,  
and   σ(ROA)   is   an   estimate   of   the   standard   deviation   of the rate of return on assets as a moving 
average. The z-score  indicates  the  number  of  standard  deviations  that  a  bank’s  return  on  assets must 
drop below its expected value before equity is depleted and the bank becomes insolvent (Boyd and 
de Nicolo, 2005), with a higher z-score indicating greater stability. As the z-score may be highly 
skewed, we follow Laeven and Levine (2009), and use the natural logarithm of the z-score as the risk 
measure. In addition, we use the capital ratio (Equity), represented in our study by the ratio of equity 
to assets,which measures the degree of protection offered to the bank by its equity. We expect that 
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capital  injections,  in  particular,  should  positively  affect  banks’  capital  ratios.  In  addition,  to evaluate 
the effectiveness of individual bailout measures, we use the liquidity ratio (Liquidity).  
The first stage of the crisis results in a deterioration  in  banks’   liquidity  positions.  Without  adequate  
mechanisms, liquidity problems can quickly become a capital crisis. Greater liquidity will also 
positively  influence  a  bank’s  access  to  capital.  To  investigate  how  injections  enable  banks  to  improve  
their liquidity positions, we include the ratio of liquid assets to short-term borrowing.  
3.2.2. Control variables  
Our primary interest is in the effects of various intervention mechanisms on a bank’s  performance. 
To this end, we include five intervention mechanisms in our regressions, as well as a general 
intervention dummy. The latter exclusively captures the effect of any kind injection into a distressed 
institution. The dummy intervention variable is equal to one if any type of intervention, including 
blanket guarantees, liquidity provisions, government-assisted mergers, or use of an AMC have been 
employed to  restore  a  distressed  bank’s  financial  position  and  zero  for  non-assisted banks.  
Further analysis examines the effects of specific types of government interventions on the assisted 
banks’  recovery. Therefore, we include a dummy variable equal to one if an assisted bank has been 
offered government protection and zero otherwise. Similarly, we include a dummy variable equal to 
one if an assisted bank has either received liquidity provisions, been nationalized, been restructured 
with government assistance and merged with another institution, or been restructured through the 
use of an AMC. For all banks not subject to one of these policy applications, we assign a value of zero.  
Moreover, the loans-to-assets ratio (Activity) controls for the volume of banking activity. We assume 
that banks more heavily involved in traditional banking activities suffer less from the crisis than banks 
with higher ratios of non-interest activities (De Jonghe, 2010). In addition, the design of the 
intervention program will vary, depending on the types of activities a bank engages in. Several 
studies suggest that recovery for less efficient banks requires more time and that such banks tend to 
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have lower capital ratios (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Williams, 2004). Following these studies, we 
include a cost to income ratio (Efficiency) to control for operating efficiency. Additionally, we also 
include return on assets(ROA) to control for the magnitude of financial shock affecting each financial 
institution. We expect that intervention is more likely for banks with weaker financial performance 
and will require more time to recover. We also control for bank size, defined as total assets (in 
logarithmic form) (Asset),  a  variable  used  to  measure  a  bank’s  market  power,  returns  to  scale, and 
diversification benefits. Larger banks are more likely to be heavily affected by the crisis than smaller 
banks, and thus require more complex resolution measures (Dam and Koetter, 2012). Additionally, 
they are more likely to receive support, due to their systemic importance. We control for a country’s  
macroeconomic environment by including GDP growth (Gdpgrowth) and the inflation rate (in 
logarithm) (CPI). We assume that bank recovery will be negatively affected as a crisis worsens. 
Finally, we capture the differences between countries’   institutional structures by including 
institutional variables, including explicit deposit protection, capital adequacy requirements, and 
strength of domestic supervisors in imposing changes. Existing research has shown that stronger 
institutional environments may increase the effectiveness of regulatory intervention measures due 
to the role of market mechanisms (Dam and Koetter, 2012; Dell’Ariccia  and  Ratnovski,  2012). Finally, 
we include the level of concentration of the banking sector(Concentration), measured as the 
percentage of banking system assets held by the three largest banks. We expect that systemic crises 
will have a greater effect with the increasing concentration of the banking sector, due to the 
appearance of “too  big  to  fail”  institutions. 
3.3. Sample 
3.3.1. Country-level Statistics 
Table I presents country-level summary statistics. Additionally, it shows the timing of systemic 
banking crises together with their locations.  
[Table I] 
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The countries differ with respect to development stage, the nature and depth of their crises, the 
structure of their banking sectors, and government reactions to systemic banking crises. Most of 
sample consists of developing countries, with only five out of twenty-five classified as developed. 
This is not surprising, as Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)document that crises are much more prevalent 
in emerging economies than in developed economies. Moreover, regarding the extent of 
government involvement in banking crises, intervention was more common in developing nations. In 
particular, in countries such as Indonesia, Columbia, or Malaysia, the government support covered 
the majority of the banking sector, a consequence of the high   concentration   of   these   countries’  
banking sectors. However, with respect to the types of government support, there are no significant 
differences between developing and developed countries.  
3.3.2. Differences  in  banks’  performance  – bivariate test 
Table IIpresentsbivariate DID estimations of performanceof supported and non-supported banks 
over two time-periods: the year of intervention, and the five consecutive years following the 
intervention.The results are grouped by intervention measure. 
[Table II] 
In general, we find statistically significant differences in performance between supported and non-
supported institutions after the intervention period. At the time of intervention, there are no 
observed differences between these two banking groups. This is not surprising, given the systemic 
nature of such crises, which normally affect the entire banking sector. This evidence also confirms 
recent studies suggesting that it is very difficult for policymakers to distinguish between distressed 
and non-distressed institutions (Freixas and Parigi, 2008). Interestingly, the results suggest that the 
gap in the banks’   financial performance increases as the crises continues. As our results show, 
supported institutions suffer more than non-supported institutions,a surprising finding given that 
intervention measures aim to restore the financial performance of distressed banks. This result might 
suggest the ineffectiveness of regulatory actions.Specifically, we find that following the intervention 
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period,banks that receive support are less capitalizedand have lower profitability ratiosand riskier 
portfolios than other institutions. Importantly, we observe significant differences in these indicators, 
depending on the policy instrumentsapplied to banks.  
We observe the largest differencesin bank performance among banks that were offered government 
protection, both in the cases of nationalized banks and banks that participate in debt restructuring 
programsinvolving AMCs. More specifically, the results suggest that institutions supported by such 
measures have lower z-scores, lower capital ratios, lower liquidity ratios, and larger proportions of 
impaired loans among their assetsfollowing interventions (specification I, III, V). This result might 
suggest that banks that receive aid tend to engage in more risky projects than control group banks. In 
addition, the results suggest that supported institutions become less efficient than their non-
supported competitors following intervention. These results appear to support the literature, which 
argues that politically dominated instrumentsdecrease the efficiency of banks due to lower 
governance standardsand lack of a proper restructuring process,resulting froma policy of restraint 
and the limited expertiseof national regulators with respect to debt restructuring (Kane, 1989; 
Klingebiel, 2000; Morrison and White, 2013).  
In terms of bank activity, there is no statisticallysignificant difference between supported and non-
supported banks,although supported banks have lower capital ratios than non-supported banks. The 
only exception is nationalization, where the activity of nationalized banks significantly 
decreasescompared to both the intervention period and other banks. This finding might suggest that 
political involvement hampers banking sector recovery,a result that is consistent with the literature 
on thestate-ownership of banks, which suggests that politiciansmight use banks to pursue their own 
interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Iannotta et al., 2007). 
Our evidence suggests that liquidity provisions tend to improve banks’ financial indicators 
(specification II). Although there are statistically significant differences in the ratios between 
supported banks and banks in the control group, this differenceappears to decreaserelative to the 
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intervention period. This evidence suggests that liquidity provision might be an effective way to 
improve banks’   financial   ratios, in agreement with studies documenting that liquidity 
provisionimproves banks’   liquidity,givingbanks access to additional capital (Hakenes and Schnabel, 
2010). Improved performance in the supported banks following government-assisted merger 
transactions is due to the nature of this measure,and reflects the superior financial performance of 
the acquirercompared with that of the acquired bank.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Do the right banks receive government support during the crises? 
To assess  the  effectiveness  of  regulatory  policy  measures  in  restoring  banks’  health,  the  right  banks  
must be subject to intervention and the bailout instruments should address the problems of such 
banks. Thus, in this section, we estimate the probability of receiving a specific policy measure, given a 
bank’s  and  country’s characteristics. We run probit, and alternatively,logit regressions on the sample 
of non-supported and supported banks to investigate the determinants of government intervention. 
We assign a dummy variable equal to one to a bank that was supported at time t and zero for all 
other banks. To avoid simultaneity bias, we include control variables as one-year lags (t-1). We also 
include the  country’s  dummies   in the regression. We assume that banks with weaker performance 
and capital ratios are more likely to receive appropriate government support. Table III presents the 
results. The first column lists the general determinants of government support.However, the 
additional estimations refer to the determinants of the use of specific policy instruments defined as: 
blanket guarantee, liquidity provision, government-assisted merger, nationalization, and AMC, 
respectively.  
[Table III] 
The regression results in the first column present important implications. Specifically, they suggest 
that less capitalized banks are more likely than more capitalized banks to receive government 
support. This result appears to suggest that regulatory aid goes to the institutions that need it most, 
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in line withDam and Koetter' (2012) study. Further, this result is consistent with evidence provided 
byFaccio et al. (2006),who show thatwhile bailouts go to politically connected firms, these firms 
exhibit significantly worse financial performance than their non-connected peers at the time of and 
following the bailout.Thus, the authors conclude that, for some countries, the allocation of capital 
through connected firms may alleviate distressed economies.  
Moreover, we find that larger institutions are more likely than smaller institutions to receive 
government support during crises, reflecting the systemic importance of such banks,and consistent 
with such studies fromGropp et al. (2011) or Dam and Koetter (2012). The estimations suggest that 
less liquid banks are more likely than others to receive liquidity support such as public protection and 
central bank funding (specification (2) and (3)). The result is promising,as the purpose of such 
measures is to restore banking sector confidence by improving the sector’sliquidity. Thus, such a 
result justifies regulatory actions.  
The findings forrestructuring programs suggest that banks with balance-sheet problems are more 
likely to receive capital support. The equity coefficient on nationalization is negative and statistically 
significant (specification (4)). Again, the results justify the use of these measures in cases of highly 
distressed banks. Additionally, the regression results suggest that less profitable banks are more 
likely than others to be nationalized, suggesting that nationalization is used as a last resort for banks 
in deep financial and capital distress. We expected that government-assisted mergers were more 
likely to be used in countries less affected by the financial crisis, or in the initial stages of a crisis. 
Accordingly, we observe a positive sign for the GDP growth coefficient. Finally, the data suggest that 
the use of the restructuring programs is reserved for larger banks. However, we do not observe 
significant coefficients for other measures taken to support banks. The resultsmay indicate that 
objective criteria do not always drive the decision to assign a bank to a restructuring program. This 
could also explain why most research finds that this measure is not very effective in restoring 
banking sector stability (Klingebiel, 2000; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). 
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5. How  effective  are  government  interventions  in  restoring  banks’  health? 
The aim of government interventions is to ensure that banks survive and operate competitively, 
which requires improvementsin banks’  liquidity,  capital,and profitability ratios. The empirical results 
from this study have shown that bailout measures target distressed banks, and that the appropriate 
types of policy instruments were employed toaddress   banks’   specificproblems. This section 
investigates whether these measures assist distressed banks recover from their distressed positions.  
5.1. Probability of recovery, given government intervention instruments  
We first assess the effectiveness of intervention mechanisms by estimating the probit model to 
evaluate the likelihood that a bank that receives government support survives over the following five 
years, and thus recovers from distress. This type of analysis provides a first impression of the 
effectiveness of intervention measures. We run the regression on the sample of supported banks, 
assigning a dummy variable with a value of one to a bank that fails within five years following 
government intervention, and zero to a bank that survives. Hence, a positive coefficient indicatesa 
higher probability of a bank failure. This analysis uses the same explanatory variables in the 
regression as previous sub-section, including the dummies for the types of intervention instruments 
employed. Similarly, we include country fixed effects to explicitly control for countries’   institutional  
differences, which might affect banks’ recoveries. Table IV presents the regression results.  
[Table IV] 
The estimation results have interesting implications. In general, the estimation results show that 
government intervention increases the   probability   of   a   bank’s   failure,a result that is highly 
statistically significant. In addition, the magnitude of the effect is large. In the previous section, we 
showed that government support goes to the banks most in need. Therefore, we would expect that 
government actions, if effective, shouldimprove a bank’s financial condition and increase the 
probability ofa bank’s  recovery.  These findings suggest the opposite. Government interventions may 
beineffective because they occur too late, the financial support provided is too weak to sufficiently 
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improve the banks’   conditions, or the intervention is poorly implemented.Findings with regard to 
specific bailout measures present a more detailed picture.  
Liquidity provisions and government-assisted mergers are positively correlated with bankruptcy in 
the years following the intervention. The results might suggest that liquidity provisions were 
implemented too late, and  did  not  address  the  bank’s  actual problems, in that these banks may have 
already experienced capital-related problems before the crisis. Alternatively, the liquidity provisions 
may not have been sufficiently  large  to  restore  banks’  liquidity  positions, leading to insolvency. The 
effect of government-assisted mergers seems to be due to the nature of this policy measure, which 
involves the absorption of a distressed bank.  
Blanket guarantees and nationalizations are positively related to bank survival following an 
intervention, withboth coefficients highly significant and negative. There might be several 
explanations for this. First, both public guarantees and nationalization offer government protection 
against bankruptcy. Second, it is relatively more likely thatsuch banks will receive additional support 
if the crisis continues and their situation deteriorates. This also explains why these measures have 
correlate  with  banks’  risk-taking behavior (Dam and Koetter, 2012; Hryckiewicz, 2014). The results do 
not show a significant effect of AMC on the probability of bank failure. This result is consistent with 
the findings of Klingebiel (2000), who shows that the effectiveness of this measure is mixed and 
mainly depends on the institutional mechanisms of a country.  
Coefficients for other financial variables are largely consistent with the existing literature. Higher 
profitability and bank capital decreases the probability of failure. The results also suggest that larger 
institutions tend to collapse less frequently than smaller ones. This result could be expected, given 
the various measures and public protectiontargeting large institutions due to their systemic 
importance (Brown and Dinc, 2009). Finally, the results show that probability of bank failure 
decreases as the sector becomes more concentrated. This result is consistent with the explanation 
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that more concentrated banking systems are more easily monitored (Beck et al., 2006). Alternatively, 
the larger institutions are more likely to be rescued because they are “too  big  to  fail.”   
5.2. The effectiveness of government intervention measures  
5.2.1. Difference in differences approach – supported versus non-supported banks 
In the previous sub-section, we demonstrated that banks in more distressed positions are more likely 
than others to receive government support. However, our evidence also shows that such banks are 
more likely to collapse afterwards. This result is surprising, given that intervention measures are 
implemented to save distressed banks. Given the previous analysis, we examine the reasonsbehind 
the increased probability of failurefor banks that receive support by examiningthe effectiveness of 
government interventions in improving the performance of distressed banks. To this end, we use the 
DID approach to compare the performance of supported banks with that of non-supported banks at 
the time of intervention,and thereafter. This methodology allows us to test our hypotheses regarding 
the timing, scale, and effectiveness of government intervention instruments and to control for 
endogeneity resulting from the fact that supported banks have a weakened position at the time of 
intervention, and therefore show weaker performance after government intervention compared to 
other banks.  
Comparing supported banks with non-supported banksat the time of intervention allows us to 
examine the supported  banks’  financial conditions. A highlysignificant difference between these two 
banking groups might indicate that supported banks were already highly distressed,suggesting time 
inconsistency with respect to government support. Macroeconomic factors are included to partially 
control for external factors that might also cause bank distress at the time of intervention. If we find 
significant improvementsin supported banks following the intervention program, as compared with 
the previous period, we may conclude that the intervention measures are effective in restoring 
banks’  financial  performance.   
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We will also compare relative bank performance under different intervention programs. This analysis 
will allow us to evaluate the effectiveness of various bailout programs, where we allow for the 
simultaneous implementation of several policy measures for one bank. We can then test our 
hypotheses regarding the importance of scale and structure of government interventions in 
determining the effectiveness of intervention instruments. Table Vpresents the results of our 
analysis, grouped by intervention policy measures, for the following performance measures: 
(log)zscore, equity ratio, and liquidity ratio, respectively.1 
[Table V] 
The estimation results present several interesting findings. First, they show that, in 
general,supported banks’  performance  deteriorated   in the period following intervention compared 
to the intervention period. It is possible that intervention measures were unable to significantly 
improve bank performance. By contrast, non-supported bank performance improved or just slightly 
deteriorated during the same sample period. This result is consistent with the literature presented by 
opponents of government intervention, suggesting that government actions are ineffective in 
restoring long-term banking sector stability (di Patti and Kashyap, 2010).  
More importantly, the results document that differences in performance between supported and 
non-supported banks is significant following intervention but not at the time of intervention. This 
finding appears to preclude the hypothesis that interventionsoccur too late and thus go to bankrupt 
banks,rather than to distressed banks that require government support. Our previous findings also 
suggest that regulators are able toselect the institutions that most require government assistance. 
These findings further suggest that the timing and types of institutions subject to government actions 
are consistent with theoretical background.  
                                                 
1 We also check the robustness of our analysis,using such measures as the ratio of loan loss reserves to total 
assets and the ratio of impaired loans to total assets. The main results remain the same and this additional 
analysis is available upon request.  
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However,we observe heterogeneity in our results, depending on the intervention instrument and the 
bank performance measure used. The largest performance decreasesoccurred among banks offered 
blanket guarantees,were nationalized, or used an AMC as a debt restructuring mechanism. These 
results are also in line with our summary statistics. For all measures, we observe that bank 
performance deteriorated relative to both the intervention period and to competitors. These findings 
are independent of the bank performance measure used. However, for non-supported banks, we 
observe only a slight decrease in performance compared with the intervention period,and 
significantly smaller than that for supported banks.  
The results have several important implications. First, they suggest that blanket guarantees are 
ineffective in providing liquidity for banks that already have liquidity problems. Accordingly, the 
evidence suggests that blanket guarantees do not effectively restore confidence during a liquidity 
crisis. This finding is consistent with evidence provided by Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) and Kane 
and Klingebiel (2004),who show that blanket guarantees are only effective if they are credible, a 
condition that is difficult to fulfill during systemic banking crises. Similarly, Schnabel (2004)shows that 
only a combination of blanket guarantees and significant liquidity provision can restore the liquidity 
of distressed banks. Additionally, our results regarding liquidity provisions show that this measure is 
effective   in   improving   banks’   performance.   In particular, we do not observe any significant 
deterioration in the ratiosused here to measure performance among supported banks following this 
type of intervention. We find an improvement in the capital ratio following liquidity injections when 
that ratiois used as our endogenous variable. This most likely suggests that improved liquidity 
grantsbanks access to favorable capital funding. However, taking into consideration the results of the 
previous sub-section suggesting that these banks are also more likely to fail, we argue that the scale 
of financial support granted to these banks may have beeninsufficient to build a significant capital 
buffer against the future consequences of the crisis. Thus, as our results suggest, the scale of 
financial support appears to be important in enabling a bank to recover.  
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Second, we observe that the z-score and liquidity ratios significantly decreased for nationalized 
banks, compared with the initial period, whereas the capital ratio slightly increased for these 
institutions. These results might indicate that,despite increases in the capital ratio, pure capital 
injections cannot restore a bank’s  balance  sheet.  Deep  restructuring  is required to clean up a bank’s  
toxic assets and restore its long-term sustainability (House and Masatlioglu, 2010; Bhattacharya and 
Nyborg, 2010). Importantly, this also explains the ineffectiveness of the AMC intervention 
instrument. Politicians’   reluctance   to   undertake   restructuring   often renders thesemeasures 
ineffective (Kane, 1989;Boot and Thakor, 1993; Morrison and White, 2013). The resultsregarding 
government-assisted mergersshow that the financial performance of banks participating in this type 
of rescue program improved following the intervention period, an unsurprising result, given that the 
distressed institution must be restructured before a takeover. 
5.2.2. Exploring heterogeneity among supported banks  
Generally, we have shown that supported banks underperformed relative to their non-supported 
counterparts, as well as to their own performance atthe time of intervention period, controlling for 
country-specific economic conditions. These results imply that government interventions are 
ineffective in restoring banking sector stability. In this section, we examine how the effectiveness of 
government interventions might change, as we control for the scale and structure of bailout 
programs. By the structure of a bailout program, we refer to the combination of various regulatory 
measures applied to a given bank. By the scale of intervention, we refer to the number and type of 
intervention measures. We assume that, among interventions, various forms of capital injection are 
largest in scale and thus should significantly improve a bank’s  charter  value.  To  answer  this question, 
we run the same types of regressions as in the previous sub-section, limiting the sample to supported 
institutions. This approach allows us to evaluate the relative effectiveness of various bailout 
programs. In other words, we compare the effectiveness of individual mechanisms to other available 
intervention mechanisms, or to intervention packages. We examine the relative effectiveness of the 
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following structures: 1) guarantees with liquidity provisions, 2) nationalization with the use of an 
AMC, 3) government-assisted mergers with the use of an AMC, 4) guarantees with nationalization 
and use of an AMC, 5) liquidity provisions with nationalization, and 6) liquidity provisions and 
government-assisted mergers with the use of an AMC. We then compare the financial performance 
of banks supported by a single policy measure (PART I) and by a combination of instruments (PART 
II), in both cases relative to banks supported by other measures. Table VI presents the results, 
grouped into two parts: banks supported by a single policy measure and banks supported by a 
combination of different measures. 
[Table VI] 
The first part of the analysis demonstrates that the financial performance of almost all supported 
banks deteriorated relative to the initial period. However, the regression results also show that, 
under a given specific intervention program, this drop was less significant. This finding suggests 
distinctivedegrees of effectiveness of various intervention measures. We find that the greatest 
dropsin performance occurred in banks that were offered blanket guarantees, nationalized, and 
employed the AMC strategy. We also find that differences in the financial performance of these 
banks, compared to other supported banks and with their own performance in the initial period, 
remain statistically significant. For other intervention measures, the differences disappear. For 
government-assisted mergers, we observe an improvement in financial performance compared with 
that of other supported banks.However, this result is due to the integration of a distressed bank into 
a stronger institution. The evidence suggests that blanket guarantees and nationalization are the 
least effective bank performance restorationmeasures, supporting our previous conclusions.  
The second part of the table presents the estimation results for various bailout programs. In general, 
these results provide a similar picture. All supported banks experienced significant drops in financial 
performance (except in cases of government-assisted mergers) relative to the intervention period. 
The results, however, indicate that the largest drops occurred in cases of blanket guarantees, 
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nationalization, and the AMC strategy. The resultsappear to suggest that this combination of policies 
is the least effective in restoring banking sector stability. However,we also observe that declines in z-
scoresare lowest for the combination of liquidity provisions with nationalization and AMC.  
This result suggests two important conclusions. Given a significant scale of intervention, it appears 
that the scale of government support affects a  bank’s  recovery.  It  also  appears that the design of a 
bailout program plays a role in facilitating a bank’s   recovery.   We   show that liquidity provisions 
accompanied by appropriate resolution mechanisms are the most effective policy combination in 
achieving banking sector recovery. This conclusion is consistent with studies that find that pure 
capital injections are insufficient to restore banking sector stability. Restructuring mechanisms are 
therefore needed,a conclusion in line with the evidence from House and Masatlioglu (2010) and 
Bhattacharya and Nyborg (2010). In addition, our results suggest the ineffectiveness of politically 
dominated intervention instruments in restoring banking sector stability, in accordance with findings 
fromBerger and Bouwman (2009),Gropp et al. (2011), and Dam and Koetter (2012). 
5.2.3. Impact of acountry’s   institutional   environment   on the effectiveness of regulatory 
intervention measures 
As shown previously, the scale and design of a bailout program influences its effectiveness. Existing 
theory also suggests that appropriate institutional infrastructure may enhance the effectiveness of 
intervention. Sweden is an example where strong regulatory mechanisms and limited state 
partnership in banking sector restructuring led to the success of most of the policy 
actionsimplemented.  
To analyze which regulatory measures should work best, given a country’s   institutional  
infrastructure, we again employ a DID approach. However, we now differentiate banks according to 
the institutional infrastructure of the countryin which the banksreside. To this end, we create a 
dummy variable equal to one if an institutional variable is above its median and zero otherwise. This 
allows us to distinguish countries according to the stringency of its regulatory environment. We then 
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interact the specific intervention measure with an institutional dummy,enabling us to compare the 
performance of banks supported by a specific policy measure but located in countries with strong 
regulatory environments with banks supported by the same measure but located in less 
institutionally developed countries. We expect that strong institutional infrastructure facilitatesbank 
recovery. Table VII presents results examining the following institutional mechanisms: explicit 
deposit state guarantees, strength of capital requirements, and power of supervisory authorities.  
 [Table VII] 
In general, the results show that, at the time of intervention, banks in countries with stronger 
institutional environmentsexhibit better financial ratios than their counterparties in less developed 
countries. This is seen in the coefficients for almost all banks that receive support. Interestingly, the 
evidence shows that this situation changes following regulatory intervention. The performance of 
supported banks in countries with highly developed institutional infrastructure deteriorates more 
than in countries with less developed institutional environments. This result holds for almost all 
intervention measures and is most significant for such politically dominated measures as 
nationalization and use of an AMC. This result appears to suggest that, in countries with strong 
regulations and powerful regulators, an increase in state ownership in the banking sector might 
result in misuseof banks for political purposes (Beck et al., 2010; Barth et al., 2009). Alternatively, a 
stronger institutional infrastructure may place supported banks in less competitive positionsthan for 
their counterpartsin weaker institutional environments. 
4. Conclusions 
The paper analyzes the effectiveness of regulatory interventions intended to enhance banking sector 
stability. In our paper, we test four important questions.First,does government support go to the 
institutions that need it most? Second,do the regulatory measures employed address  banks’  specific 
problems?Third,how effective are government interventions in enhancing banking sector stability? 
Finally, how isthe effectivenessof government intervention influenced bya country’s   institutional  
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environment? The regression results demonstrate that weak banks are most likely to receive 
government support and that the type of support extended addresses   banks’   specific problems. 
However, our results indicate that supported banksare weaker than their non-supported 
counterparts. We attribute this to the insufficient scale of liquidity provisions and the ineffectiveness 
of regulators in implementing the necessary restructuring. We also find that strengthening the 
market disciplining mechanisms in the post-crisis period may enhance the effectiveness of 
intervention measures.  
The results offer several contributions to the existing literature. We find that government support 
goes to banks with relatively weak financial performance, in accordance with the theoretical 
literature arguing that government interventions are justified because they allow distressed 
institutions to recover from crisis, helping to stabilize the banking sector (Bagehot, 1873; Acharya 
and Yorulmazer, 2006; Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010). Our regression 
analysis also shows that less liquid banks are likely to receive liquidity support, and undercapitalized 
banks are likely to receive capital support. In this respect, our study contributes to the literature on 
the determinants of bank bailouts by rejecting the hypothesis that government interventions are 
ineffective because they do not  address  banks’  actual  problems.   
However, although government support goes to the right banks, and that the types of injections 
employed   address   banks’   problems,   the   third   part   of   our   analysis   suggests   that   government  
interventions are ineffective in restoring banking sector stability. Our analysis shows that the z-score, 
a measure of distance of a bank from bankruptcy, deteriorates more significantly among institutions 
that receive assistance than among institutions that do not receive assistance, controlling for a 
country’s  economic  conditions. We argue that this is because of a lack of necessary restructuring in 
the institutions that received assistance, a finding in line with the literature advocating mandatory 
bank bail-ins before the implementation of bailout mechanisms (see for example Financial Stability 
Board, 2011; Huertas, 2011; European Commission Act, 2011; Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). The scale of 
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liquidity support is also important. Sufficiently large liquidity provisions are necessary to steer banks 
away from insolvency risk. Finally, we find that appropriate institutional mechanisms may enhance 
the effectiveness of some of regulatory measures.  
Our results have important policy implications. First, they show that the design and scale of an 
intervention program determines its success in facilitating banking sector recovery. Our results 
demonstrate that liquidity provision accompanied by a strategy of bank resolution significantly 
improvesa bank’s financial condition. Second, we find that the implementation of intervention 
measures is crucial to the effectiveness of government intervention. A deep restructuring process is 
required for banks to recover from distress, as pure liquidity provisionsarenot sufficient to avert bank 
failure, especially if the crisis persists. Finally, the evidence reveals that policy measures that rely on 
market disciplining mechanisms perform better than measures involving the participation of the 
state. Thus, regulators may improve the effectiveness of intervention measures by strengthening 
market disciplining mechanisms. 
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Table I: Descriptive statistics at the country level 
The data present statistics for sample countries for which we could identify institutions subject to intervention  
Country  
Year of 
systemic 
crisis 
 
Number of 
banks’bankru
ptcies 
Number 
of non-
bailed 
banks 
 
Number 
of bailed 
banks 
 
 
Guarantee 
dummy 
 
 
Liquidity 
dummy 
 
 
Nation. 
dummy 
 
 
Merger 
dummy 
 
 
AMC 
dummy 
Argentina 2001 1 6 8 0 7 2 1 3 
Bulgaria 1996 0 7 2 0 1 2 0 2 
Colombia 1998 2 4 9 0 5 2 5 2 
Croatia 1998 1 8 6 0 0 4 3 4 
Czech 
Republic 1996 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Ecuador 1998 0 8 2 2 1 0 0 2 
Estonia 1992 0 2 4 0 2 1 3 3 
Finland 1991 0 3 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Indonesia 1997 2 1 12 11 5 10 1 8 
Jamaica 1996 0 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 
Japan 1997 2 4 13 11 0 2 8 9 
Korea 1997 0 7 6 3 1 2 4 2 
Lithuania 1995 0 1 2 2 0 2 1 2 
Malaysia 1997 5 8 7 3 2 1 4 2 
Mexico 1994 1 3 5 4 3 1 3 2 
Nicaragua 2000 3 4 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Norway 1991 0 5 7 7 6 2 0 4 
Paraguay 1995 0 6 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Russia 1998 0 6 2 0 1 0 1 1 
Sweden 1991 0 4 3 2 1 0 2 1 
Thailand 1997 2 5 5 5 2 3 1 3 
Turkey 2000 0 5 8 3 4 1 6 4 
Ukraine 1998 0 6 2 0 2 0 0 2 
Uruguay 2002 4 6 2 0 2 2 0 1 
Venezuela 1994 1 4 2 0 1 1 0 1 
Total -      25 118 114     58    52 42 46 62 
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Table II:Differences  in  the  banks’  performance as a result of government interventions (bivariate test) 
The table presents difference-in-differences (DID) estimates of bank performance: (log)zscore, equity ratio, and liquidity ratio, respectively. 
Banks are grouped into banks supported by policy injections (blanket guarantee, liquidity provisions, nationalization, and use of an AMC) 
and non-supported. The estimates show differences in bank performance at the time of intervention and in the five-year period following 
government intervention. The DID estimates are presented in the last column. The robust standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
                                                           At the intervention  After intervention 
Intervention measure            Non-intervened Intervened Difference Non-intervened Intervened Difference Diff-in-diff 
BLANKET GUARANTEES (I)        
Activity 51.828 65.541 13.713** 46.696 51.876 5.179 -8.534 
 
(4.401)  (4.637)  (5.548)  (2.467)  (6.666) (5.981)  (6.262) 
Size 6.693 8.373 1.680** 6.955 8.637 1.682** 0.001 
 
 (0.316)  (0.823)  (0.786)  (0.356) (0.755) (0.644) (0.232) 
Zscore 22.298 38.810 16.512 25.192 5.831 -19.361*** -35.873 
 (15.578) (19.116) (27.517) (6.735) (1.820) (6.857) (29.155) 
(Log)zscore 1.822 4.062 2.240** 2.219 1.110 -1.109*** -3.349*** 
 
(0.890) (0.000) (0.890) (0.182) (0.395) (0.389) (1.179) 
Equity 8.772 5.062 -3.711 12.054 -1.270 -13.324*** -9.614 
 
(3.459) (1.007) (3.572) (1.059) (3.574) (3.653) (5.633) 
        Loss Reserves 12.132 18.722 6.590 11.013 15.242 4.229 -2.362 
 
(3.579) (14.843) (14.991) (2.211) (4.505) (4.571) (11.965) 
Liquidity 38.527 19.601 -18.926*** 39.042 22.174 -16.868*** 2.058 
 
(6.484) (3.179) (6.420) (4.441) (4.038) (5.237) (3.548) 
        Profitability (ROA) -1.814 -0.998 0.815 0.953 -5.276 -6.229** -7.045 
 
(2.739) (0.802) (2.820) (0.342) (2.834) (2.869) (4.178) 
Efficiency 77.184 77.315 0.131 73.036 89.036 15.999* 15.869 
 
(8.609) (8.735) (10.518) (4.321) (8.161) (8.076) (11.775) 
LIQUDITY PROVISIONS (II)               
Activity 54.732 59.338 4.606 47.664 49.223 1.559 -3.047 
 (3.538) (5.430) (3.558) (2.415) (5.766) (4.406) (2.902) 
Size 7.188 7.387 0.199 7.349 7.574 0.225 0.026 
 (0.597) (0.443) (0.664) (0.561) (0.424) (0.611) (0.230) 
Zscore 43.052 23.903 -19.149 23.374 10.525 -12.848 6.300 
 (22.807) (11.603) (25.588) (6.631) (2.550) (7.510) (26.516) 
 
(Log)Zscore 3.377 2.165 -1.213 2.080 1.586 -0.495** 0.718 
 (0.676) (0.471) (0.824) (0.186) (0.259) (0.219) (0.897) 
Equity 11.134 1.497 -9.638* 9.987 4.512 -5.475*** 4.163 
 (1.813) (5.030) (5.099) (1.740) (2.173) (1.750) (5.302) 
Loss Reserves 7.827 24.638 16.811 9.447 19.365 9.918* -6.893 
 (2.130) (14.137) (14.216) (1.500) (5.921) (5.731) (10.043) 
Liquidity 38.822 20.968 -17.855*** 38.134 25.228 -12.905*** 4.949 
 (6.351) (3.226) (6.060) (4.437) (3.459) (4.169) (4.088) 
Profitability (ROA) 0.525 -4.962 -5.487 -0.004 -2.678 -2.674 2.812 
 (1.310) (4.082) (4.242) (0.738) (2.020) (1.839) (4.789) 
Efficiency 73.058 84.738 11.679 73.981 85.289 11.308 -0.372 
 (7.841) (11.147) (11.907) (4.376) (6.450) (6.914) (13.569) 
 
NATIONALIZATION (III)               
Activity 56.702 55.643 -1.059 50.218 39.683      -10.535*** -9.475 
 (3.668) (7.024) (5.634) (2.779) (4.034) (2.933) (6.282) 
        
Size 7.146 7.653       0.506 7.361 7.608 0.247 -0.259 
 (0.480) (0.550) (0.556) (0.508) (0.431) (0.507) (0.192) 
        
Zscore 28.942 29.699      0.757 23.045 7.329 -15.716** -16.473 
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 (19.233) (18.130) (31.355) (6.002) (3.300) (6.546) (33.497) 
(Log)zscore 2.143 2.995       0.853 2.132 1.111 -1.022** -1.874 
 (1.125) (1.029) (1.884) (0.164) (0.504) (0.482) (2.288) 
        
Equity 8.250 5.051 -3.198 10.078 2.096       -7.982* -4.783 
 (3.050) (0.847) (3.045) (1.356) (4.214) (4.080) (5.466) 
        
Loss Reserves 10.642 26.217 15.574 10.456 18.918      8.462 -7.112 
 (3.191) (21.486) (21.444) (2.079) (5.099) (5.186) (17.234) 
        
Liquidity 32.698 30.306 -2.392 34.857 32.339      -2.518 -0.125 
 (5.390) (4.373) (4.927) (4.253) (4.586) (4.580) (3.569) 
        
Profitability (ROA) -1.991 -0.021 1.970 -0.070 -3.400  -3.330  -5.300 
 (2.306) (0.898) (2.292) (0.645) (2.824) (2.768) (3.537) 
        
Efficiency 76.096 80.946 4.850 73.760  91.125  17.366**   12.516 
 (7.408) (10.588) (10.069) (4.655) (6.159) (7.587) (11.078) 
MERGER (IV)               
Activity 55.152 60.333 5.181 47.320 50.791      3.472 -1.710 
 (4.636) (3.848) (4.629) (3.303) (4.473) (4.684) (3.218) 
        
Size 6.863 8.435 1.572** 7.068 8.624       1.556** -0.016 
 (0.333) (0.836) (0.702) (0.373) (0.763) (0.589) (0.275) 
Zscore 34.150 0.721 -33.429** 21.721 12.944      -8.778 24.651 
 (14.034) (0.000) (14.034) (6.144) (1.960) (6.639) (15.800) 
(Log)zscore 3.148 -0.327 -3.475*** 1.940 1.989       0.049 3.524*** 
 (0.660) . (0.660) (0.209) (0.154) (0.166) (0.671) 
Equity 8.033 5.991       -2.042 8.870 7.241 -1.628 0.413 
 (3.119) (1.001) (3.150) (2.019) (1.010) (1.869) (3.659) 
        
Loss Reserves 17.767 5.442 -12.325 13.248 8.530       -4.718* 7.607 
 (7.762) (0.909) (7.704) (2.549) (1.350) (2.290) (6.003) 
Liquidity 33.866 27.007 -6.859 36.437 27.061      -9.377* -2.518 
 (5.881) (4.388) (6.764) (4.445) (4.133) (5.301) (4.010) 
        
Profitability (ROA) -1.725 -0.985 0.740 -0.842  -0.322  0.520  -0.220 
 (2.429) (0.677) (2.432) (1.046) (0.559) (0.771) (2.531) 
        
Efficiency 77.949 75.178 -2.771 79.252 68.927      -10.325* -7.554 
 (7.583) (9.427) (9.224) (4.544) (3.608) (5.028) (9.902) 
AMC (V)               
Activity 55.208 59.045 3.838 49.139 45.470      -3.669 -7.506 
 (3.892) (5.066) (3.658) (2.741) (5.290) (4.464) (4.922) 
        
Size 6.689 8.475 1.786*** 7.013 8.418       1.405*** -0.381 
 (0.374) (0.676) (0.608) (0.405) (0.625) (0.477) (0.232) 
Zscore 43.052 23.903 -19.149 24.352 8.306       -16.045** 3.103 
 (22.807) (11.603) (25.588) (6.429) (2.615) (6.809) (27.167) 
        
(Log)zscore 3.377 2.165 -1.213 2.181 1.289       -0.892** 0.321 
 (0.676) (0.471) (0.824) (0.173) (0.345) (0.327) (1.011) 
Equity 8.591 5.236 -3.355 10.695 2.893       -7.802*** -4.447 
 (3.416) (0.589) (3.322) (1.494) (2.319) (1.891) (4.086) 
Loss Reserves 84.768 69.763 -15.005 100.295 103.468     3.173 18.177 
 (16.173) (9.951) (14.076) (9.910) (13.847) (15.204) (19.021) 
Liquidity 34.775 26.674 -8.101 36.855 28.455      -8.399** -0.299 
 (5.934) (4.442) (6.105) (4.173) (4.161) (3.534) (4.082) 
Profitability (ROA) -2.178 -0.183  1.995  0.295 -3.345 -3.640** -5.636 
 (2.621) (0.605) (2.536) (0.518) (1.938) (1.571) (2.963) 
36 
 
Efficiency 77.316 77.060 -0.256 73.067 87.312      14.244** 14.500 
 (8.750) (7.612) (9.601) (4.417) (6.655) (6.888) (8.916) 
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Table III: Probability of receiving government support given  all  banks’  and  countries’  individual  characteristics 
The table presents probit and logit estimations, showing the probability of receiving government support, given the bank and country financial conditions. The control variables are included as first-year lags. In all 
regressions,  we  include  country  dummies.  The  robust  standard  errors  are  clustered  at  the  country’s  level.  ***,  **,  and  *  denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
  Intervention 
Dummy 
 
Guarantee 
 
Liquidity 
 
Nationalization 
 
Merger 
 
AMC 
 Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit 
Profit.t-1 0.036 0.023 0.127* 0.073* 0.018 0.011 -0.139* -0.077** 0.040 0.020 -0.039 -0.022 
(0.065) (0.041) (0.074) (0.043) (0.059) (0.036) (0.073) (0.039) (0.076) (0.044) (0.074) (0.041) 
            
Equity t-1 -0.074** -0.043** -0.072 -0.044 -0.055 -0.035   -0.125* -0.075* -0.026  -0.014 -0.069 -0.044 
(0.032) (0.018) (0.054) (0.031) (0.041) (0.024) (0.070) (0.040) (0.034)   (0.018) (0.056) (0.030)    
            Liquidity t-1 -0.015 -0.009* -0.054*** -0.031*** -0.036***  
(0.013) 
-0.021***. 0.013 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.001 0.000 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.020) (0.010) (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008)   (0.017) (0.009) 
           Efficiency t-1 -0.001 -0.000 .0051085 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
(0.003) (0.002) .0038947 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
             Size t-1 0.365** 0.220*** 0.451*** 0.259*** 0.021 0.012 0.114 0.066 0.426*** 0.253*** 0.429*** 0.257*** 
(0.117) (0.069) (0.155) (0.082) (0.149) (0.090) (0.172)      (0.112) (0.109) (0.062) (0.134) (0.077) 
             GDP 0.043 0.024 0.116 0.071 -0.007 -0.004 0.078 0.045 0.140*** 0.082*** 0.077 0.046 
growth (0.052) (0.031) (0.077) (0.044) (0.054) (0.032) (0.054) (0.033) (0.041) (0.023) (0.054) (0.031) 
             CPI 0.611* 0.344* -0.201 -0.119 0.493   0.302 0.490 0.280 0.418 0.255 0.604* 0.362* 
 (0.366) (0.204)  (0.495) (0.263) (0.340) (0.202) (0.319) (0.201) (0.304) (0.169) (0.362) (0.206) 
Concen. 0.013 0.008 0.040*   0.022** 0.018** 0.011** 0.004 0.002 -0.005 -0.003 0.021* 0.013* 
 (0.013) (0.007)  (0.022) (0.011) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.017) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) 
Constant -3.224** -1.893** -5.281** -2.983*** -1.060 -0.651 -2.551 -1.453 -5.498*** -3.233*** -5.727*** -3.397*** 
 (1.476) (0.875) (2.171) (1.111) (1.605) (0.954) (1.858) (1.204) (1.179)  (0.659) (1.874) (1.027) 
R2 0.162 0.162 0.343 0.346 0.126 0.126 0.121 0.124 0.151 0.154 0.170 0.173 
Number of obs.  144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 
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Table IV:  Probability  of  bank  failure,  given  banks’  and  countries’  individual  characteristics 
The table shows the probit estimations,  indicating  the  probability  of  a  bank’s  failure  in  the  five  years  following  specific  regulatory  actions.  
In all regressions, we include country dummies. The robust-standard errors are clustered at the country level.  ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%. 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Variable 
Intervention 
Dummy Guarantee Liquidity Nationalization Merger AMC 
Intervention Dummy 2.147*** -2.519** 1.818** -1.758** 1.704*** 0.301 
 
(0.665) (1.031) (0.707) (0.893) (0.553) (0.439) 
Profitab.(ROA) -0.134* -0.108 -0.107 -0.058 -0.051 -0.092 
 
(0.081) (0.099) (0.103) (0.072) (0.052) (0.075) 
Equity -0.166*** -0.142** -0.081** -0.146*** -0.141*** -0.116*** 
 
(0.037) (0.069) (0.032) (0.039) (0.041) (0.036) 
Liquidity -0.019 -0.035* -0.006 -0.009 -0.020 -0.015 
 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) 
Efficiency 0.003 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.005* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Size -0.537*** -0.345*** -0.482*** -0.471** -0.649*** -0.523*** 
 
(0.139) (0.142) (0.147) (0.194) (0.196) (0.124) 
Gdpgrowth -0.101 -0.097 -0.114 -0.018 -0.099 -0.115 
 
(0.073) (0.078) (0.074) (0.071) (0.074) (0.071) 
CPI 0.054 -0.059 -0.257 0.052 0.011 0.044 
 
(0.184) (0.245) (0.249) (0.226) (0.258) (0.190) 
Concen. -0.052*** -0.082*** -0.090*** -0.075*** -0.098*** -0.085*** 
 
(0.012) (0.029) (0.017) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021) 
Constant 6.749*** 9.641*** 8.060*** 8.326*** 10.152*** 9.319*** 
  (2.502) (2.454) (2.290) (2.994) (2.909) (2.255) 
R2 0.281 0.284 0.409 0.397 0.385 0.285 
Number of obs.  74 74 74 74 74 74 
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Table V:  Effectiveness  of  policy  measures  in  improving  banks’  performance,  using  the  DID  approach 
The table presents difference-in-differences (DID) estimations of bank performance: (log)zscore, equity, and liquidity ratio, respectively. 
Banks are grouped into banks that received support, depending on the policy employed (blanket guarantee, liquidity provisions, 
nationalization, and use of an AMC), and non-supported. The estimates show differences in bank performance at the time of intervention 
and over the next five years following government intervention. The DID estimates are presented in the last column. All regressions include 
bank and country control variables (not reported): activity, efficiency,   bank   size,   gdpgrowth,   log(inflation),   and   the   banking   sector’s  
concentration ratio. In all regressions, we include country dummies. The robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***,**, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Performance measure At intervention After intervention  
(LOG)ZSCORE (I) Non-intervened Intervened Difference Non-intervened Intervened    Difference  Diff-in-Diff 
GUARANTEE 
       
 
1.569 4.296 2.727*** 1.924 0.650       -1.274*** -4.001***
 
(0.862) (0.515) (0.828) (0.442) (0.416) (0.220) (0.996) 
R2=0.448 
       Number of obs.=757 
       LIQUDITY 
       
 
2.593 2.313 -0.280 1.488 1.036       -0.452* -0.172 
 
(0.917) (1.141) (1.118) (0.555) (0.654) (0.244) (1.142) 
R2= 0.374 
       Number of obs.=757 
       NATIONALIZATION 
       
 
1.669 3.060 1.391 1.529 0.722       -0.807** -2.198 
 
(1.236) (1.438) (1.933) (0.462) (0.507) (0.311) (2.096) 
R2=0.227 
               Number of obs.=1010        
        
MERGER 3.190 0.099 -3.090*** 1.624 1.541       -0.083 3.007*** 
 
(1.220) (0.648) (0.777) (0.540) (0.606) (0.198) (0.802) 
 
       
AMC 2.705 2.443 -0.262 1.597 1.000       -0.597** -0.335 
 
(0.935) (1.075) (1.122) (0.522) (0.512) (0.225) (1.220) 
 
       
R2= 0.381 
       Number of obs.=757        
EQUITY RATIO (II) 
       GUARANTEE        
 
32.901 30.251 -2.650 32.810 28.954      -3.857** -1.206 
 
(7.227) (6.812) (1.772) (6.903) (6.428) (1.591) (1.703) 
R2= 0.266 
       Number of obs.= 1057 
       LIQUDITY 
       
 
32.015 27.752      -4.263*** 31.348 28.107 -3.241** 1.022 
 
(7.178) (6.837) (1.398) (6.797) (6.623) (1.212) (1.668) 
R2= 0.270 
       Number of obs.=1057 
       NATIONALIZATION 
       
 
32.544 28.670 -3.873* 32.046 28.913      -3.134** 0.740 
 
(7.417) (7.253) (2.079) (7.136) (6.711) (1.322) (2.086) 
R2=0.263 
       Number of obs.=1057 
       MERGER 
       
 
32.869 32.163 -0.706 32.618 31.925      -0.693 0.013 
 
(7.343) (6.797) (1.395) (6.953) (6.635) (1.154) (1.208) 
R2=0.252 
       Number of obs.=1057 
        
 
AMC 
       
 
32.290 29.471 -2.819* 31.929 28.624      -3.305** -0.486 
 
(7.077) (6.552) (1.503) (6.678) (6.423) (1.346) (1.698) 
R2=0.266 
       Number of obs.=1057               
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LIQUIDITY RATIO (III) 
GUARANTEE        
 
73.337 65.999 -7.338 73.445 61.392 -12.053* -4.715 
 
(13.159) (12.207) (8.313) (12.246) (10.637) (5.869) (3.962) 
R2=0.486 
       Number of obs.=997 
       LIQUDITY 
       
 
70.746 61.471 -9.275 69.794 60.737 -9.056** 0.218 
 
(12.880) (12.921) (6.963) (11.968) (11.932) (3.981) (4.103) 
R2=0.486 
       Number of obs.=997 
       NATIONALIZATION 
       
 
70.924 63.369 -7.555 71.073 57.936 -13.137** -5.582 
 
(12.469) (11.409) (6.300) (11.889) (10.846) (5.550) (5.062) 
R2= 0.491 
       Number of obs.=997 
       MERGER 
       
 
72.524 73.153 0.629 72.811 69.401 -3.411 -4.040 
 
(13.343) (13.114) (5.999) (12.553) (12.366) (3.177) (4.288) 
R2=0.470 
       Number of obs.=997 
       AMC 
       
 
71.712 68.742 -2.970 72.058 63.941 -8.116*** -5.147 
 
(12.546) (12.679) (5.072) (11.902) (10.917) (2.449) (4.795) 
R2=0.479 
       Number of obs.=997 
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Table VI:Effectiveness   of   policy   measures   in   improving   banks’   performance   under   various  
intervention programs 
The table presents difference-in-difference (DID) estimations of banks performance measured by the log(zscore). Banks are grouped into 
those supported by a single policy measure (blanket guarantee, liquidity provisions, nationalization, and the use of AMC) and those 
supported by a combination of policy measures as: 1) guarantee with liquidity provisions, 2) nationalization with use of an AMC, 3) 
government-assisted mergers with use of an AMC, 4) guarantee with nationalization and AMC, 5) liquidity provisions with nationalization, 
and 6) AMC, liquidity provisions with government-assisted mergers. The estimates show differences in bank performance at the time of 
intervention and over the next five years following government support. The DID estimates are presented in the last column. All 
regressions include bank and country control variables (not reported): activity, efficiency, bank size, gdpgrowth, log(inflation), and the 
banking  sector’s  concentration  ratio.  In  all  regressions,  we  include  the  country  dummies. The robust standard errors are clustered at the 
country level. ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 At intervention  After intervention  
(LOG)ZSCORE  
Other 
intervened 
banks 
Intervened by a 
specific policy Difference 
Other 
intervened 
banks 
Intervened by a 
specific policy Difference Diff-in-Diff 
PART I 
GUARANTEE               
 
-0.385 3.693 4.078*** 0.619 -0.347 -0.965*** -5.044*** 
 
(1.085) (1.054) (0.632) (0.887) (0.871) (0.264) (0.575) 
R2=0.488 
       Number of obs.=366 
       LIQUDITY 
       
 
-0.388 1.486 1.875** -0.388 -0.338 0.050 -1.824** 
 
(0.987) (1.264) (0.788) (0.987) (0.935) (0.322) (0.735) 
R2=0.434 
       Number of obs.=366 
       NATIONALIZATION 
       
 
-1.356 2.010 3.366*** -0.291 -0.796 -0.505* -3.871*** 
 
(1.254) (1.427) (1.146) (0.946) (0.981) (0.245) (1.187) 
R2=0.45575 
       Number of obs.=366 
               
MERGER 
       
 
2.193 -1.136 -3.329** -0.481 -0.093 0.388* 3.717*** 
 
(1.607) (1.368) (1.192) (1.075) (1.092) (0.199) (1.207) 
R2=0.454 
       Number of obs.=366 
       AMC 
       
 
-0.279 1.476 1.755** -0.279 -0.530 -0.250 -2.005** 
 
(0.969) (1.250) (0.729) (0.969) (0.985) (0.195) (0.800) 
R2=0.438 
       Number of obs.=366 
        
PART II 
GUARANTEE             
*LIQUIDITY 
       
 
-0.437 4.070 4.506*** 0.139 -0.240      -0.379 -4.886*** 
 
(0.951) (1.033) (0.424) (0.935) (0.808) (0.311) (0.376) 
R2=0.463 
       Number of obs.=366 
       NATIONALIZATION*
AMC 
       
 
-1.213 2.081 3.294** -0.421 -0.753      -0.332 -3.627*** 
 
(1.242) (1.524) (1.193) (0.985) (0.989) (0.273) (1.256) 
R2=0.448 
       Number of obs.=366 
       MERGER*AMC 
       
 
2.230 -1.122 -3.352*** -0.377 0.021      -0.356 3.708*** 
 
(1.622) (1.342) (1.186) (1.043) (1.081) (0.256) (1.232) 
R2=0.449 
       Number of obs.=366 
               
 
 
       
42 
 
 
GUARANTEE* 
NATIONALIZATION*
AMC 
 
-0.382 3.966 4.348*** 0.432 -0.401 -0.833 -5.180*** 
 
(1.199) (1.295) (0.460) (1.286) (1.325) (0.265) (0.504) 
R2=0.468 
       Number of obs.=339 
               LIQUIDITY* 
NATIONALIZATION*
AMC 
       
 
-0.853 2.501 3.354** 0.049 -0.141 -0.189 -3.543*** 
 
(1.363) (1.722) (1.210) (1.276) (1.301) (0.315) (1.178) 
R2=0.443 
       Number of obs.=339 
               LIQUIDITY* 
MERGER 
       
 
2.758 -0.629 -3.388** 0.278 0.609 0.331 3.718*** 
 
(1.786) (1.424) (1.204) (1.353) (1.481) (0.221) (1.233) 
R2=0.448 
       Number of obs.=339 
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Table VII: Effectiveness of regulatory intervention measures under various institutional structures 
The table presents difference-in-differences estimations of bank performance measured by (log)z-scores. Banks are grouped into banks 
supported by single policy measures (blanket guarantee, liquidity provisions, nationalization, and use of an AMC). We differentiate 
countries based on level of institutional development, using following variables: existence of explicit deposit protection, level of capital 
requirements, and power of supervisory authorities. Countries are then divided into those with strong institutional infrastructure 
(institutional variable above the median) and those with weak institutional structures (institutional variable below the median). The 
estimates  show  the  differences  in  the  banks’  performance  at  the  time  of  intervention  and  as  an  average  over the five-year period following 
government support. The DID estimates are presented in the last column. All regressions include bank and country control variables (not 
reported   here)   as:   activity,   efficiency,   bank’s   size,   gdpgrowth,   log(inflation),   and   the banking   sector’s   concentration   ratio.   The   robust  
standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
                                                                     At intervention                                                         After intervention 
Log(zscore)      Non-intervened Intervened Difference   Non-intervened Intervened Difference Diff-in-Diff 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM 
GUARANTEE 
       
 
0.160 4.443 4.283*** 0.160 0.037       -0.122 -4.406***
 
(1.317) (1.387) (0.300) (1.317) (0.951) (0.453) (0.538) 
R2= 0.601 
       Number of obs.=165 
       
LIQUDITY 
       
 
-2.275 -1.416 3.691 -3.207 -3.073      0.134 -3.557 
 
(1.378) (1.439) (0.830) (1.659) (1.458) (0.416) (0.416) 
R2= 0.478 
       Number of obs.=165 
       
NATIONALIZATION 
       
 
-0.976 -1.732 -0.755 -0.976 -4.113 -3.136*** -2.381** 
 
(1.568) (2.438) (1.116) (1.568) (1.991) (0.560) (0.985) 
R2=0.644 
       Number of obs.=165 
       
MERGER 
       
 
-0.443 0.233 0.676 -0.443 0.455       0.898*** 0.222 
 
(1.218) (1.220) (0.527) (1.218) (1.347) (0.293) (0.472) 
R2= 0.553 
       Number of obs.=165 
        
AMC 
       
 
0.889 3.414 2.525* 0.889 0.679       -0.211 -2.736** 
 
(1.771) (2.550) (1.343) (1.771) (1.738) (0.331) (1.210) 
R2= 0.552 
       Number of obs.=165               
 
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
GUARANTEE 
 0.505 4.911 0.505***   0.405 0.813 0.407 0.098*** 
 
(1.363) (2.111) (1.361)   (1.275) (1.382) (0.286) (0.398) 
R2= 0.604 
   
      
Number of obs.=168        
LIQUDITY 
   
      
 
-2.512 0.368 2.880**   -2.667 3.744 1.077** -1.803 
 
(1.410) (2.015) (1.132)   (1.652) (1.692) (0.434) (1.206) 
R2=0.499 
   
      
Number of obs.=213        
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NATIONALIZATION 
 
-3.879 3.386 7.265***   -2.460 -0.704 1.757** -5.508*** 
 
(1.654) (1.608) (1.497)   (1.733) (1.178) (0.653) (1.654) 
R2=0.671 
   
      
Number of obs.=141        
          
MERGER          
 
-1.055 0.256 1.310**   -0.798 0.545 -1,334** -0.024 
 
(1.096) (1.013) (0.593)   (1.207) (1.148) (0.593) (0.191) 
R2=0.549 
    
    
Number of obs.=159 
                
AMC         
 
0.591 6.144 5.553***   1.842 2.012       0.169 -5.384*** 
 
(1.398) (1.942) (0.787)   (1.565) (1.599) (0.362) (0.883) 
R2=0.576         
Number of obs.= 189         
 
POWER OF SUPERVISORY 
GUARANTEE 
       
 
0.496 6.044       5.548***  0.496 1.668 1.172* -4.376***  
 
(1.215) (1.012) (0.457)  (1.215) (0.753) (0.633) (0.397)  
R2=0.602 
   
      
Number of obs.=168          
LIQUDITY 
   
      
 
-2.275 -2.139 0.136  -2.449 -4.337 -1.888*** -2.024  
 
(1.378) (1.954) (1.247)  (1.643) (1.598) (0.262) (1.191)  
R2=0.487          
Number of obs.=179          
NATIONALIZATION 
   
      
 
-3.879 4.634 8.513  -2.460 0.545 3.005*** -5.508***  
 
(1.654) (1.857)            (1.671)  (1.733) (1.438) (0.551) (1.654)  
R2=0.670 
   
      
Number of obs.=141          
MERGER 
   
      
 
-0.519 1.443 3.136***  -0.336 -0.154 0.182 -2.954  
 
(2.438) (2.115) (0.560)  (1.210) (1.476) (0.449) (0.449)  
R2=0.528 
   
      
Number of obs.=159 
   
      
AMC 
   
      
 
0.601 4.000       3.399***  1.839 -0.162 -2.001*** -5.400***  
 
(1.375) (1.386) (0.441)  (1.534) (1.011) (0.581) (0.853)  
R2=0.576 
   
      
Number of obs.=189               
 
 
 
